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6.1  Introduction 
In recent years researchers have paid increasing attention to the impact 
of  the unemployment insurance system on various labor market phe- 
nomena. Two strands of  research in this area can be distinguished. In the 
first, researchers have been concerned with the influence of  unemploy- 
ment benefits on labor supply and unemployment. The decision to par- 
ticipate in the labor force or to end a spell of  unemployment rests with the 
individual person. Unemployment benefits are viewed as a subsidy to 
participation, leisure, or search, and, hence, both labor force participa- 
tion and unemployment duration should increase with unemployment 
benefits (see Classen 1977; Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 1976; Hamermesh 
1977 1978; Katz 1977). 
The second strand of  research has been developed from the recent 
work on labor contracts (see Azariadis 1975; Baily 1974; Gordon 1973). 
Explicit allowance is made for temporary layoffs and recalls by firms in 
response to changes in the demand for their output. Since laid off  em- 
ployees qualify for unemployment benefits, the level of benefits may well 
influence the pattern of  layoffs and recalls. Moreover, benefit payments 
are financed in the U.S. by  a payroll tax which typically is partially 
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experience rated. Experience rating means that a firm’s tax rate rises 
(falls) in response to increases (decreases) in benefit payments to the 
firm’s own  ex-employees. Thus the higher the  degree of  experience 
rating, the higher will be the tax cost of temporary layoffs. Examples of 
theoretical models of a typical firm’s response to changes in the unem- 
ployment insurance system are presented in the papers by Baily (1977), 
Brechling (1977a b), and Feldstein (1976). Although these models have 
not been subjected to extensive tests, relevant empirical information is 
presented in Brechling and Jehn (1978), Feldstein (1978), and Halpin (in 
press). 
In this paper, an attempt is made to contribute to the second strand of 
research. In particular, it contains the results of  empirical tests of  the 
Baily-Feldstein type of model. For this purpose the main structure and 
theoretical predictions of the Baily-Feldstein model are presented sum- 
marily in section 6.2. Section 6.3 contains amendments, elaborations, 
and extentions of the Baily-Feldstein model. The main part of  section 6.3 
consists of  parameterization of  the experience-rating system which cor- 
responds as precisely as possible to a system currently in use in the U.S. 
The empirical tests are presented in section 6.4, and section 6.5 contains 
the main conclusions of  the paper. 
The  empirical evidence lends substantial support to the Baily-Feldstein 
type of  model. In particular the parameters which determine a firm’s 
layoff and rehire decisions seem to be strongly influenced  by the degree of 
experience rating. It would appear, therefore, that increases in the de- 
gree of  experience rating are likely to lead to substantial decreases in 
layoffs and, hence, in unemployment. 
6.2  The Bay-Feldstein Model 
Although the papers by Baily (1977) and Feldstein (1976) differ in 
detail and exposition,  they  contain  substantially the same model  of 
layoffs and unemployment insurance. Hence no distinction is made be- 
tween them. Moreover, since both papers are published in eminent and 
readily available journals the following summary of the model is verbal, 
nonformal, and brief.’ 
In the Baily-Feldstein model, the firm offers its employees a long- 
term-say  , annual-set  of  employment  conditions. These  conditions 
cover (1) wage rates; (2) hours worked; (3) the probability of being laid 
off; and (4)  duration of  the layoff. The total utility which the worker 
derives from these four items is a constraint to the firm. It is given by 
competitive conditions in the labor market. Thus although the firm may 
vary the four items in a mutually offsetting manner, the value of the total 
package cannot be changed by the firm which is assumed to maximize its 
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The total contract period is divided into two subperiods: In the first, the 
firm faces a high price for its output; in the second, a low price. Hence, 
both employment and hours tend to be lower in the second than in the 
first subperiod, and some workers are likely to be laid off at the beginning 
of the second subperiod. In the long run, however, these layoffs are not 
involuntary from the workers’ point of  view because the total expected 
remuneration contains compensation for the expected layoffs. 
The introduction of  an unemployment benefit system without experi- 
ence rating raises the total expected remuneration of  workers who are 
subject to layoffs, and, hence, both the workers and the firm should gain. 
It is important to note, however, that the gain can be realized only 
through layoffs, and, hence, the firm has an incentive to lay off  more 
workers than in the absence of  unemployment benefits. In other words, 
when there is no unemployment benefit system, firms must compensate 
workers for spells of layoff unemployment. With a benefit system, on the 
other hand, part of the compensation for layoffs is borne by  the unem- 
ployment benefit system. Unemployment benefits thus lower the mar- 
ginal cost of  layoffs to firms. 
Experience rating may offset, partially or fully, the reduction in the 
marginal cost of layoffs caused by unemployment benefits. For instance, 
if the firm were billed immediately for the benefit payments, then, in the 
absence of income tax on  benefits, the marginal costs of layoffs would not 
be changed, and layoffs would be neither encouraged nor discouraged. 
The above arguments can be illustrated conveniently by  Feldstein’s 
formula for the subsidy to layoffs: 
[  (1 -  tb) -  (1 -  t,)e]b 
J1= 
(1 -  $1 
where b is the benefit received by laid off  workers per period of  time, 
e is the proportion of  b payable immediately by the firm, rb is the tax 
on unemployment benefits, and ty is the income tax rate payable on 
wage  income.  In  the  U.S.,  tb=O,  so  that  the  formula  becomes 
J2 = [l -  (1 -  ty)e]b/(l-  ty). This expression shows that, even if  experi- 
ence rating were perfect, so that e= 1, the subsidy to layoffs would be 
positive, namely J3 =  tyb/(l  -  ty).  The reason is that the firm’s wage com- 
pensation for layoffs is (income) taxable, while unemployment benefits 
are not.  These tax effects would disappear  only when  rb=ry  so that 
equation 1 becomes J4  = (1 -  e)b, which, in turn, becomes zero when 
e=  1, that is, when experience rating is perfect. 
So far, attention has been confined to the impact of the unemployment 
benefit system upon layoffs. But the Baily-Feldstein model also yields a 
unique prediction for the impact of the unemployment benefit system on 
the level of  hours worked during the second subperiod. A rise in the 190  Frank Brechling 
layoff subsidy J raises the level of  layoffs, but it also raises the level of 
hours worked by the employees who have not been laid off. 
The theoretical predictions of  the Baily-Feldstein model can thus be 
stated summarily as follows: given that unemployment benefits are not 
(income)  taxed, layoffs and  average hours  worked in  the depressed 
subperiod rise with (1) ceteris paribus increases in unemployment ben- 
efits; (2) ceteris paribus decreases in the degree of experience rating; and 
(3) ceteris paribus increases in the tax rate on wage income. 
It should perhaps be pointed  out that one prediction of  the Baily- 
Feldstein model depends crucially on the assumption that the composi- 
tion  of  the long-term compensation package changes in response  to 
changes in  unemployment benefits. This assumption is attractive and 
plausible, especially for a long-run analysis. It may be, however, that in 
some industries competition in the labor market does not generate the 
kinds of  responses that are obtained by Baily and Feldstein. What hap- 
pens, for instance, if  the firm’s compensation package is independent of 
unemployment  benefits?  In the papers  by  Brechling (1977a b), this 
assumption was made.  It leads to the following intuitively plausible 
results: when the system is experience rated, then an increase in unem- 
ployment benefits generates a rise in the marginal tax costs of  layoffs, 
and, hence, a decline in the optimal level of  layoffs. An increase in the 
degree of experience rating also raises the marginal tax costs and, hence, 
as in the Baily-Feldstein model, lowers optimal layoffs. In other words, 
an increase in unemployment benefits leads to a rise in  layoffs in the 
Baily-Feldstein model, but to a reduction in layoffs in the Brechling 
model. But increases in the degree of experience rating reduce layoffs in 
both types of models. Since the real world may well be a mixture of the 
Baily-Feldstein and Brechling models, the impact of unemployment ben- 
efits on layoffs may not be as strong as that of  experience rating.’ 
6.3  Extensions of the Model 
In this section, two amendments of  the Baily-Feldstein model  are 
described and discussed. The first refers to the duration of  temporary 
layoffs, and the second to the precise nature of experience rating. Let us 
deal with the two amendments in turn. 
6.3.1 
In the Baily-Feldstein model, the price for the firm’s output drops to 
some low level at the beginning of the second subperiod and remains at 
that level until the end of  the subperiod. In response, the firm lays off 
some employees for the entire subperiod, after which presumably they 
are recalled. In other words, the duration of  layoffs for workers who do 
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not search for and obtain jobs at other firms is assumed to equal the 
second subperiod. 
It  should  be  realized,  however,  that  the  layoff  subsidy J  can  be 
obtained by the firm not only by laying off more employees but also by 
lengthening the layoff duration of  a given number of  layoffs, unless the 
layoff duration exceeds the maximum unemployment benefit period. 
Hence, if  the firm does have some control over the layoff duration, this 
duration must be expected to increase with  increases in  the level of 
unemployment benefits and with decreases in the degree of  experience 
rating. 
It would appear that a relatively minor change in the structure of  the 
Baily-Feldstein model should make the layoff duration a choice variable 
for the firm. Suppose, for instance, that the firm holds inventories which 
could be  accumulated in  the first subperiod  and decumulated in  the 
second subperiod. In these circumstances, the following conjecture has 
intuitive appeal: a rise in unemployment benefits or a fall in the degree of 
experience rating should induce the firm to raise its production at the 
beginning of  the first subperiod, accumulate inventories, lay off  some 
employees before the beginning of the second subperiod and, thereafter, 
decumulate inventories. In this case, the layoff duration for at least some 
laid off workers is likely to exceed the second subperiod. Since the main 
focus of this paper is empirical rather than theoretical, the above conjec- 
ture has not been examined formally. It is simply hypothesized that, since 
firms have an inducement to lengthen the layoff duration in response to a 
rise in the layoff subsidy, some firms actually do so. Hence the average 
layoff duration is expected to react positively to increases in unemploy- 
ment benefits and negatively to increases in the degree of  experience 
rating. 
6.3.2  Amendments for Experience Rating Provisions 
The second amendment to the Baily-Feldstein model consists of  a 
precise parameterization of the experience-rating provisions. In the Feld- 
stein (1976) treatment, for instance, the degree of  experience rating is 
summarized by  one parameter, the proportion e of  benefit payments 
charged to the firm. Actually the relevant laws do not fix e but another set 
of parameters, so that observed levels of  e are likely to be endogenous in 
the firm’s decision process. 
Several systems of  experience rating are currently in use in the U.S. 
The reserve ratio method is, however, the most common system, used in 
thirty-two states. The ensuing theoretical discussion as well as the later 
empirical analysis is confined entirely to the reserve ratio method. 
Under the reserve ratio method of  experience rating, each firm is 
assigned an account in the state unemployment insurance system. The 192  Frank Brechling 
balance in this account changes in response to tax inflows and benefit 
outflows. Formally: 
(2)  B,- B,-  =  r,m -  b, 
where B, is the firm's balance at the end of period t, T is the tax rate, m is 
the tax base or taxable payroll, and b are the benefit payments which are 
charged to the firm. All flows are measured per calendar year, and, for 
the sake of  simplicity, B,, m, and b, are normalized for the level of 
employment, so that they measure balance, taxable payroll, and benefits 
per employee. When equation 2 is divided by m,  its left-hand side repre- 
sents changes in the reserve ratio: 
(3) 
where R, is the reserve ratio at the end of  period t. 
The essence of the reserve ratio method of experience rating consists of 
a link between rt  and R,-  which is given by the tax schedule. A typical 
such schedule is presented in figure 6.1. The unbroken Line (A-B-C-D-E- 
F) is described fully by five parameters: NEGTAX, MAXTAX, SLOPE, 
MINTAX and MINRES. Let us discuss them in turn. 
NEGTAX is the tax rate which applies to firms with a negative balance, 
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MAXTAX is the highest tax rate applicable for firms with positive 
balances along (C-D). 
SLOPE measures the slope of  the line (D-E).  Actually there are a large 
number of  small steps along (D-E)  which have been approximated by a 
straight line. 
MINTAX is a critical low tax rate at which the tax schedule becomes 
horizontal, namely along (E-F). 
MINRES is the minimum reserve ratio at which the sloped part of the 
tax schedule begins. 
All five parameters are necessary and sufficient for a complete descrip- 
tion of  the schedule. Moreover, each may change ceteris paribus. The 
laws of  the thirty-two states with the reserve ratio method of experience 
rating determine the tax schedules which imply the above five param- 
eters. Moreover, the parameters vary automatically with the aggregate 
balance in a state's unemployment insurance fund. When the fund level 
falls below certain trigger levels, the parameters are changed so as to 
ensure increased tax flows, and vice versa. 
The next question is: how do changes in the above five parameters 
affect the degree of  experience rating? To answer this, let us begin by 
assuming that the tax schedule has no kinks or steps, so that it is sloped 
throughout like the line (G-H)  which has its intercept at a. The tax rate T, 
can then be expressed as a simple function of  R,  - : 
(4)  T,=  u -  s Rt- 1 
where s =  SLOPE. Note that s is measured as a positive number: a rise ins 
means that the slope of the function gets steeper. When equations 3 and 4 
are combined, a simple first-order difference equation is obtained: 
(5)  m 
b,  R,= (1  -s)  R, -  1 +  u -- 
Since s is always smaller than unity (typically  s =  .3),  equation 5 is stable in 
the sense that it approaches R* =  R, =  R,-  for any constant a -  (bjm). 
The steady state reserve ratio is given by: 




T:  Or  T:  m =b, 
Thus, in the steady state, tax inflows just equal benefit outflows, and, 
hence, the balance and reserve ratio do not change. 
The dynamic pattern described by  equation 5 depends crucially on 
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The latter is equal to the product of  (a) the firm’s layoff rate; (b) the 
average duration of layoffs; and (c) unemployment benefit per period of 
time. Increases in one or more of these three variables lead to an increase 
in b and, hence, raise benefit outflows in relation to tax inflows. 
Suppose, for instance, that the reserve ratio and tax rate are at K in 
figure 6.1.  If  R,? and T,? are the relevant steady state values, then K 
represents a point at which benefit outflows exceed tax inflows, so that 
R, -  is falling and T,  is rising. During the transition, the firm’s balance is 
reduced. Conversely, if the firm is initially at K’, then tax inflows exceed 
benefit outflows and hence the firm’s reserve ratio must rise and the tax 
rate must fall. During the transition period the balance is built up. 
Suppose now that there is a cyclical pattern in b,:  let it be high in 
recessions and low in  booms. Consequently the firm’s balance is run 
down in recessions and built up in booms. But since T,  and Rt-  always 
move toward a position where benefit outflows equal tax inflows, the 
firm’s tax payments tend to equal benefit outflows, when both are sum- 
med over a sufficiently long period of  time. In this limited sense, a tax 
schedule without kinks or steps and a nonzero slope would ensure full 
experience rating. 
So far, however, neither benefit outflows nor tax inflows have been 
discounted. Once discounting is introduced, the speed with which the tax 
rate adjusts to benefit outflows becomes important. Suppose, for in- 
stance, that the firm increases its layoffs, thereby raising b,.  If, in re- 
sponse, tax rates rise very slowly, then the tax cost of  the layoffs is 
payable in the distant future and its discounted value is quite small. 
Conversely, if  the firm reduces b, and tax rates fall very slowly, the 
discounted value of  the future tax savings may be minimal. The speed 
with which the tax rate adjusts to benefit outflows  depends on two factors: 
(1) the discrete lag of  T, behind R,  -  1, which seems to be necessary for 
administrative purposes, and (2) the speed at which the reserve ratio R, 
moves toward its steady state value R,?.  As is evident from equation 5, 
this speed depends crucially on the slope of the tax schedule(s). For the 
sake of realism, let us confine attention to the case in which 0 <  s I  1. Ass 
rises from zero toward unity, the dependence of R, on the state variable 
R, -  decreases, and, hence, the relative importance of  b, increases. 
When s  = 1, R, becomes independent of  R, -  1: 
R, =  a -3  =  R: 
m  (8) 
and hence: 
(9) 
bt-1-  * 
7t=--  7,-1 
so that the reserve ratio R, is invariably at the steady state value which is 
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which is appropriate for period (t-  1). Given that the discrete lag of  T, 
behind R, -  is necessary for administrative purposes, s  = 1  represents the 
fastest reaction of  the tax rate to changes in benefit flows. It represents 
the highest achievable degree of  synchronization between benefit out- 
flows and tax inflows. 
The following important conclusion has thus been reached. If  the tax 
schedule has no kinks or steps and has a negative slope throughout, then 
in the long run a firm’s tax inflows equal its benefit outflows. But tax 
inflows lag behind benefit outflows. The speed with which taxes adjust to 
benefits depends on the slope of the tax schedule. Ass  rises from zero to 
unity this speed increases. The degree of experience rating thus reaches a 
maximum when s = 1. At the other extreme, when s =  0, the tax rate is 
independent of benefit outflows so that the degree of experience rating is 
zero. 
Unfortunately the existence of steps and kinks in actual tax schedules 
necessitates some revision of the above simple conclusion. Let us, there- 
fore, analyze the effects of  ceteris paribus changes in all five parameters, 
NEGTAX, MAXTAX, SLOPE, MINTAX, and MINRES. 
An increase in NEGTAX is illustrated in figure 6.2a. It simply raises 
the step which occurs at R,-  =  0. This change can be interpreted as an 
increase in the average slope of  the schedule in its upper range, and, 
hence, an increase in the degree of  experience rating. In other words, 
firms now have an increased incentive to avoid NEGTAX and thus an 
increased incentive to reduce benefit outflows. 
An increase in MAXTAX is shown in figure 6.2b. Two effects of this 
change can be distinguished. First, the step at R, - =  0 is reduced and this 
leads to a reduction in the average slope of  the schedule in its upper 
range. This reduces the degree of experience rating. Second, firms which 
initially are at MINTAX between E and E’ are now shifted, at least 
temporarily, to the sloped part of the schedule between G and E’ and this 
increases the degree of experience rating, Thus a rise in MAXTAX leads 
to a decrease in the degree of experience rating in the upper range of the 
tax schedule and to an increase in the lower range. 
Next consider an increase in SLOPE which is illustrated in figure 6.2~. 
Again two effects can be distinguished. First, for firms that are initially 
located between D and G the tax schedule becomes steeper, and, hence, 
the degree of experience rating is increased. Second, firms initially lo- 
cated between G and E are now moved (at least temporarily) to MIN- 
TAX and cease to be experience rated. Thus, between D and G the tax 
becomes more experience rated and between G and E it becomes less 
experience rated. 
An increase in MINTAX is shown in figure 6.2d. It unambiguously 
reduces the degree of  experience rating because firms that are located 





Figure 6.2  Increases in NEGTAX, MAXTAX, SLOPE, MINTAX, and 
MINRES 
MINTAX thus reduces the range of  tax rates over which experience 
rating applies. 
Finally, a rise in MINRES is illustrated in figure 6.2e. Again the impact 
on experience rating is ambiguous. Firms initially located between D  and 
D' cease to be experience rated at  least temporarily.  Firms initially 
located between E and E', on the other hand, are moved to the sloped 
part of  the schedule and therefore become experience rated. 
This concludes the discussion of  the two  extensions to the Baily- 
Feldstein model. According to the first, the layoff duration is treated as a 
variable which responds positively to increases in unemployment benefits 
and negatively to increases in the degree of experience rating. The second 
extension concerns the parameterization of experience rating. It has been 
related  to the parameters  of  the  tax  schedule for  the  reserve  ratio 
method. The degree of experience rating is related positively to NEG- 
TAX and negatively to MINTAX. MAXTAX, SLOPE, and MINRES 
also tend to influence the degree of  experience  rating,  but  a priori 
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6.4  Empirical Evidence 
This section contains some relevant empirical evidence on the rela- 
tionship between the parameters of the unemployment insurance system 
and layoffs, rehires, hours, and layoff duration. First, the theoretical 
predictions are restated summarily; second, the data are discussed and 
the results presented. 
The theoretical arguments in sections 6.2 and 6.3 have generated the 
prediction that layoffs, hours, and layoff duration should all rise with 
increases in unemployment benefits and with decreases in the degree of 
experience rating. Since the flow of temporary layoffs may be measured 
either by  layoffs or by  rehires,  the above prediction  applies also to 
rehires. The prediction can be made specific by using the parameters of 
the tax structure. Thus, the four dependent variables-layoffs,  rehires, 
hours, and layoff duration-should:  (1) increase with increases in unem- 
ployment benefit rate; (2) decrease with increases in NEGTAX and; (3) 
increase  with  increases in  MINTAX.  Their responses to changes in 
MAXTAX, SLOPE, and MINRES may be positive or negative. Further, 
in view of the qualifying  comments at the end of section 6.2, the impact of 
unemployment benefits may be weak. The empirical research underlying 
this paper has been designed to test these specific propositions. 
Since the models discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3 describe the behavior 
of individual firms, the data on layoffs, rehires, hours, and layoff duration 
should ideally also refer to individual firms. Unfortunately, however, no 
such micro data are readily available. Consequently the data used in the 
actual  computations are  aggregates.  Specifically, layoff  rates,  rehire 
rates, and average weekly hours refer to averages in industry-state-year 
categories.  Further, since no information on layoff  duration is read- 
ily available, the duration variable is average unemployment duration 
(in weeks).  Unemployment duration, average unemployment benefits 
(weekly in  dollars), and  the tax parameters NEGTAX,  MAXTAX, 
SLOPE, MINTAX, and MINRES all refer to state-year categories. The 
years covered are 1962-69, and the states are all reserve ratio states. But 
for  some industry-state-year categories not all relevant data are available, 
and, hence, these categories have been omitted. The number of observa- 
tions is 170 for total manufacturing, and for two-digit industries it varies 
between 126 and 48 with a mean of  about 96. All the data are readily 
available from Employment and Earnings and various publications of the 
Federal Unemployment Insurance Service. 
For the purposes of estimation the following specific assumptions and 
amendments have been made. 
1. Unemployment  beneflts are calculated typically as a fraction of 
previous earnings up to a certain limit. Hence, a state’s benefit liberality 
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wage rates. For this reason the straight-time hourly wage rate was intro- 
duced as an additional explanatory variable. This procedure has some 
obvious disadvantages, and it is to be hoped that at some future date it 
will be replaced by the use of a set of parameters which describe benefit 
liberality. 
2.  The influence of all the explanatory variables upon the four depen- 
dent variables is assumed to be linear. 
3. An additional explanatory variable is COVERAGE which is the 
ratio of  employees covered by  unemployment insurance to total em- 
ployees. This variable has been included to take account of the fact that 
layoffs, rehires,  and hours refer to total employment while the other 
variables refer only to covered employment. 
4.  Since the four dependent variables fluctuate cyclically, annual inter- 
cept dummies have been included as explanatory variables. 
Now that we have stated the theoretical predictions and discussed the 
data used in the empirical analysis, let us now turn to an examination of 
the empirical results. Table 6.1 contains the regression coefficients when 
layoffs, rehires, hours, wage, and coverage refer to total manufacturing. 
Let us discuss, in turn, the influence of  the various parameters of  the 
unemployment insurance system. 
1. BENEFITS have a positive but weak influence upon layoffs and 
duration and none on  rehires and hours. This may be owing to the reasons 
given at the end of section 6.2. But this weak result may also be due to 
multicollinearity. The simple coefficient of correlation between wage and 
benefits is 0.82. This may have caused the standard errors of  both vari- 
ables to be large. 
2.  NEGTAX has a strong negative influence upon all four dependent 
variables. This finding lends substantial empirical support to the theoret- 
ical argument that a ceteris paribus increase in NEGTAX increases the 
degree of  experience  rating  and, hence,  reduces  all  four  dependent 
variables. 
3.  MAXTAX has a strong positive influence on all four dependent 
variables. The joint impact of  NEGTAX and MAXTAX suggests that 
the average slope of  the tax schedule in its upper range is an especially 
important determinant of  the degree of  experience rating. 
4. SLOPE has a positive influence which is weak for layoffs but quite 
strong for the other three dependent variables. In terms of the theoretical 
arguments in section 6.3, the positive relationship can be interpreted as 
follows: as SLOPE increases, some firms cease to be experience rated, 
and their reaction must be stronger than that of firms which remain on the 
sloped part of  the schedule and thus face an increase in the degree of 
experience rating. 
5. The influence of  MINTAX is positive and quite strong for layoffs, 
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Table 6.1  Regression Coefficients for total Manufacturing (t-statistics in 
parentheses) 
Independent Variable  Dependent Variable 
Layoffs  Rehires  Hours  Duration 
Mean 
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an unambiguous positive sign. Hence, the empirical evidence lends some 
support to the theory. 
6.  The influence of  MINRES is  not  iniform. It  is strong only for 
duration in which case it is positive. 
7.  COVERAGE  has a very strong negative impact on layoffs, rehires, 
and hours, and a weak one on duration. There are two possible explana- 
tions of  this strong effect. In the first place,  it might be argued that 
extensions of  the unemployment insurance system reduce layoffs, re- 
hires, and hours among newly covered employees. If this interpretation is 
accepted, then the coefficients of  COVERAGE constitute fairly strong 
prima facie evidence against the Baily-Feldstein model. In the second 
place, it might be argued that COVERAGE simply corrects for the fact 
that layoffs, rehires, and hours refer to total employment, while the 
unemployment insurance parameters apply to only covered employment. 
Let X be such a parameter and let f(X) be the layoff rate for covered 
employees and a  that for uncovered employees. It can then be shown 
easily that the total layoff rate is the weighted average of the covered and 
uncovered rates f(X)  COVERAGE + a(1-COVERAGE), so that the 
linear effect of COVERAGE  is negative. A complete test of this proposi- 
tion would, however, require that COVERAGE be used multiplicatively 
with the other unemployment insurance parameters. The fact that dura- 
tion, which refers only to covered employees, is not affected by COVER- 
AGE lends some support to the second explanation. 
8. The annual dummy variables reflect the well-known cyclical pattern 
in labor turnover, hours, and unemployment: as the economy moves into 
a boom, layoffs, rehires, and duration decline and hours rise. 
Table 6.2 contains the number of positive and negative coefficients as 
well as the number of  significant coefficients for the layoff, rehire, and 
hours equations run on date for sixteen two-digit manufacturing indus- 
tries.  Since duration is  not  available by  industry, its equation is not 
included.  Further, the reader is reminded  that  BENEFITS refers to 
benefits in the state as a whole and not to those paid in the industry. 
By  and large the disaggregated data reflect the same pattern as the 
aggregate ones. BENEFITS, MAXTAX, and MINTAX still seem to 
have predominantly positive coefficients. The influence of NEGTAX is 
still strongly negative. Disaggregation has led to a fair number of negative 
signs for SLOPE. Moreover, disaggregation has much weakened the 
strong negative effect of COVERAGE,  especially for rehires and hours. 
The strong and consistent negative influence of NEGTAX is especially 
encouraging because it is incompatible with the argument that high labor 
turnover rates cause high tax schedules. As already mentioned, in most 
states the laws provide for automatic increases in the entire tax schedule 
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Table 6.2  Signs and Significance of Regression Coefficients for 16 Two-Digit 
Manufacturing Industries 
Layoffs  Rehires  Hours 
Pos  Neg  Pos  Neg  Pos  Neg 
Tot  Sig  Tot  Sig  Tot  Sig  Tot  Sig  Tot  Sig  Tot  Sig 
WAGE  83  8  6  76  96  44  129 
BENEFITS  10  8  6  1  94  73  123  43 
NEGTAX  2  0  14  11  40  126  42  126 
MAXTAX  136  3  1105  64 77  95 
SLOPE  51  11  5  75  93  115  52 
MINTAX  95  7  2  116  53 84  85 
MINRES  92  10  5  93  74 104  63 
COVERAGE  6  2  10  5  93  74 103  62 
Note: A significant coefficient is one with a t-statistic in excess of  1.5 (all t-statistics are 
treated as positive numbers). 
therefore, that a rise in layoffs may cause a rise in benefit payments, a fall 
in the state fund and, hence, a rise in the tax schedule. This argument 
would not, however, generate a full in NEGTAX. 
Another  interesting  aspect of  the empirical results  appears in  the 
duration equation. Hitherto, unemployment duration has been investi- 
gated primarily in terms of unemployment benefits and personal charac- 
teristics. As mentioned in the introduction, the papers by Classen (1977) 
and Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) are excellent examples of  this type of 
research. The evidence in table 6.1 suggests, however, that duration is 
much more responsive to the tax parameters than to BENEFITS. All 
five tax parameters,  NEGTAX, MAXTAX, SLOPE, MINTAX and 
MINRES have a significant impact on duration. This evidence is consis- 
tent with a theory according to which duration is controlled to a signifi- 
cant extent by firms through their recalls of temporarily laid off workers. 
This concludes the presentation of  the empirical results. In view of the 
fact that the unemployment insurance tax constitutes a relatively small 
proportion of  the payroll, the empirical results seem quite strong. NEG- 
TAX has a consistently strong negative impact on layoffs, rehires, hours, 
and duration. MINTAX and BENEFITS have predominantly positive 
effects. All three effects are unambiguous predictions of the theory. Two 
other parameters of  the tax structure, MAXTAX and SLOPE, tend to 
have significant effects on the four dependent variables. Thus the results 
seem to be quite consistent with a Baily-Feldstein type of model. Even if 
this kind of  model should be refuted by future evidence, it seems clear 
that many strong empirical associations exist among labor market phe- 
nomena and the parameters of  the unemployment insurance system. 202  Frank Brechling 
6.5  Conclusions 
In this paper an attempt has been made to examine the relationship 
between layoffs and the unemployment insurance system. The starting 
point of  the analysis has been the Baily-Feldstein model according to 
which both layoffs and average hours worked increase with (1)  increases 
in unemployment benefits, and (2) decreases in the degree of experience 
rating of the unemployment insurance tax. This model has been extended 
by  letting  the layoff  duration be  endogenous and by  parameterizing 
experience rating.  The empirical examination of  the relationship be- 
tween layoffs, rehires, hours, and unemployment duration as dependent 
variables and the parameters of  the unemployment insurance system as 
explanatory variables has yielded very encouraging results. The strongest 
impact is that of  NEGTAX, the tax rate which applies to firms with a 
negative balance in the unemployment insurance fund. A rise in NEG- 
TAX reduces layoffs, rehires, hours, and unemployment duration. 
Although the empirical results have been encouraging, they also sug- 
gest further research. In particular, it seems desirable to have a better 
parameterization of  benefit liberality than has been used in this paper. 
Further, it may be necessary to model explicitly the determination of the 
parameters of  the unemployment insurance tax. 
The implications of the research findings are fairly obvious. Increases 
in NEGTAX tend to reduce strongly both layoffs and unemployment 
duration. The approximate elasticities of these two relationships are .55 
and .21, respectively, so that a rise in NEGTAX of  ten percent (from, 
say, 3.4 to 3.74) might reduce layoff unemployment by as much as seven 
percent. Moreover, increases in NEGTAX would improve the financial 
viability of  the  unemployment  insurance system on two counts:  tax 
inflows would rise and benefit outflows would fall because of the reduced 
layoff unemployment. 
It is not claimed that the empirical research underlying this paper is 
more than  a  first  attempt  at  discovering potentially  important  rela- 
tionships. Thus, while the results are most encouraging, no finality is 
claimed for them at this stage. 
Notes 
1. In a recent paper Dale Mortensen  presents a generalized  version of the Baily-Feldstein 
model and shows that under theoretically standard conditions layoffs will not occur in the 
Baily-Feldstein  model. See:  Mortensen;  “On the Theory of Layoffs.” Discussion  Paper No. 
322, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwest- 
em University, March 1978. 
2. It should also be pointed out that the shifting and redistribution  of both the unemploy- 
ment benefits and the unemployment tax is likely to follow a possibly complex dynamic 
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Comment  Daniel S. Hamermesh 
Brechling’s work  is an important contribution  to the analysis of  the 
effects of  unemployment insurance (UI) and, more generally, to the 
economics of labor market policy. It takes the analysis two steps forward. 
First, and most important, Brechling shows how the structure of  the 
experience-rated tax that finances UI can be parameterized in an empir- 
ically fruitful way. This is a major step forward, both because of the closer 
link forged between the constraints facing employers and their behavior, 
and because Brechling is one of the first even to consider the empirical 
effects of this tax. Bypassing simplistic approaches-for  example, allow- 
ing the effective tax rate alone to reflect the degree of experience rating, 
an approach that has been used in studying the effects of  UI benefits on 
unemployment until recently‘-he  has advanced the literature by moving 
directly to modeling and testing the institutional details of  this tax. 
The second contribution is the analysis of  how the tax structure can 
affect the duration of  temporary layoff employment. Implicitly, Brech- 
ling conducts a “horse race” between the UI tax parameters and the 
weekly UI benefit in explaining intertemporal variations in layoff rates. 
While  I  have  some  problems  with  the  formulation  of  this  race 
-particularly  with the hobbles placed on the benefit variables in this 
sweepstakes-the  role of  imperfect experience rating in  affecting the 
duration of unemployment spells has not been pointed out before. 
While Brechling’s intuition  about the  effects of  the  individual tax 
parameters on layoff duration seems correct, formal modeling of  their 
role would be worthwhile verification. The Baily-Feldstein model con- 
tains one simple parameter (the fraction e of layoff costs paid by the firm 
through higher UI taxes). Imposing a complicated set of five tax param- 
eters implies that  the  firm  faces  different  constraints  on  its profit- 
maximizing behavior at different times, depending upon its past layoff 
experience. In other problems of this sort, the effects of changes in these 
constraints on choice variables are often counterintuitive, mainly because 
of the nonlinearities or discontinuities of  the constraints.2 
Modeling the experience-rated UI tax by  a set of  five parameters is 
important, but this particular set is not unique. For example, the re- 
serve ratio at which the minimum tax rate becomes applicable-call it 
MAXRES-could have been used in place of  SLOPE. Alternatively, 
MAXRES and SLOPE could have been used in place of  MINRES to 
describe the tax structure completely along with the other three param- 
eters. Obviously, if we measure the tax structure perfectly, the particular 
set of  parameters chosen is immaterial. However, partly because of  the 
Daniel S. Hamermesh is Professor of Economics, Michigan State University, and Re- 
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steps in the tax function between MAXRES and MINRES, but also 
because of administrative problems in assigning tax rates to firms-both 
problems that can be characterized as errors in variableewe do not 
measure the tax structure exactly. The empirical work would thus be far 
more convincing  if  each of the alternative parameterizations were used in 
the layoff and other regressions to test whether the interesting results are 
merely  an  artifact  of  the particular  parameterization Brechling  has 
chosen. 
The perennial bugaboo of  any empirical work on UI (or indeed any 
social insurance program in the U.S.) is the burden of the payroll tax that 
finances the program. Empirical work even in the area of  the flat rate 
payroll tax for OASDHI is weak; on the experience-rated UI tax it is 
nonexistent. If the tax is not shifted at all, or if only the average tax rate in 
a labor (product) market is shifted backward (forward), Brechling is 
correct in ignoring the shifting problem in analyzing the effects of this tax. 
If, though, firms correctly perceive the results of their layoff actions and 
are able to shift their own tax costs at least partly onto labor or to 
consumers of their products, tax shifting will moderate the effects of  taxes 
implicit in Brechling’s theoretical discussion. Especially in the horse race 
between  the tax parameters  and an  appropriate parameterization of 
benefits, the shifting issue should be considered. That the Baily-Feldstein 
model ignores it is no argument for ignoring it here. 
Perhaps the most important problem with the theory and empirical 
work is the dynamic simultaneity between layoffs and the parameters of 
the UI tax structure facing the individual firm. If  the layoff rate in year c 
increases because of  some exogenous shock, benefit payments rise and 
the entire tax schedule facing firms in year c + 1 will be higher. Thus a 
random error in year twill be correlated with each of the parameters in 
year c + 1  because of the existence of multiple tax schedules in each state. 
This correlation induces a complicated form of simultaneity bias into the 
equations Brechling estimates.  To take account of  this problem  and 
provide better estimates of  the effects of  the tax parameters on layoffs, 
rehires, etc., a simultaneous model that includes the determination of the 
tax parameters themselves as functions of past years’ layoffs and benefit 
payments should be estimated. 
That this point is not merely a minor econometric quibble is shown by 
the substantial  variation in tax rates within many states as the overall state 
fund balance changes. For example, in 1974, in New York, the highest tax 
rate in effect (NEGTAX) was 3.0 percent, yet on the highest schedule the 
rate was 5.2 percent. The corresponding figures for Massachusetts were 
2.9  and 5.1 percent. With the shocks that occurred in 1974 and 1975, these 
higher tax rates in fact became effective in 1976. The variation in the tax 
parameters over time is of  roughly the same magnitude as interstate 205  Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance 
variation, suggesting that the dynamic feedback effect should be mod- 
eled. 
Some specific estimation problems should be considered in any further 
work on UI financing and its effects. The COVERAGE variable pro- 
duces very strange results-an  effect on layoffs of -  13 percentage points 
(the variable’s mean is only 1.4),  and on hours worked of -  30 hours per 
week. While the paper goes to some lengths to rationalize these findings, 
they are far better rationalized by  looking at the structure of  the UI 
system. In manufacturing in the 1960s, coverage was nearly universal, as 
shown by the mean of this variable, .994. While the data are such that the 
COVERAGE measure could exceed one, it is likely that most of  the 
variation in this measure is accounted for by several outliers whose layoff 
experience happens to be correlated with this variable. 
Apart from the simultaneity problems noted above, the regression 
results appear convincing. However, it is well known that in most states 
firms with negative balances (for which NEGTAX is applicable) are in 
construction and certain seasonal manufacturing industries, while those 
to which the minimum tax rate (MINTAX) applies arein services, trade, 
and stable manufacturing industries. Recognizing this, we should observe 
that  interstate variations  in  variables like MAXTAX and NEGTAX 
should be reflected in differences in turnover rates mostly in industries 
like autos, food processing, and lumber-seasonal  industries. Similarly, 
variables like SLOPE and MINTAX should be most important in indus- 
tries like trade, industries that unfortunately are not included in Brech- 
ling’s regressions. A strong test of  the hypothesis would involve con- 
straining the coefficients of  the variables describing taxes at the lower 
reserve ratios to be zero in seasonal industries, and those at the high end 
(SLOPE, MINTAX) to be zero in nonseasonal industries. If  both con- 
straints are rejected, that would indeed be impressive. 
This suggests an interpretation of Brechling’s  strong results for NEG- 
TAX and MAXTAX, and the relatively weak ones for the other param- 
eters,  particularly  SLOPE and  MINTAX.  Manufacturing  generates 
above-average benefits relative to manufacturing  payroll^.^ That being 
the case, manufacturing firms are in most cases on that part of  the tax 
structure where the parameters applicable to firms with low reserve ratios 
are relevant. That it is these tax parameters that appear significant in 
regressions explaining layoff and other behavior in manufacturing is not 
surprising; the other parameters simply do not form part of  the set of 
constraints affecting profit-maximizing behavior in this industry. 
While the results clearly show that  experience rating matters,  the 
implicit size of its effects are too large to credit. For example, if  the value 
of NEGTAX were changed from its minimum in the sample, 2.7 percent, 
to its maximum, 5.4 percent, the change in the layoff rate would be -  .65, 2U6  Frank Brechling 
nearly half the mean of  the layoff rate. Even simulating the effect of  a 
change from the mean of NEGTAX to its maximum produces a reduction 
in layoffs of  .47, one-third of  the layoff rate. Results that imply that 
changing one parameter of  a tax that has not exceeded 1.5 percent of 
payrolls since 1950 would reduce layoffs by  one-third strain credulity 
severely. 
Perhaps the most important result of  Brechling’s work is its implica- 
tions for the political economy of the social insurance scheme. Nearly all 
of the recent empirical work by economists has focused on benefits and 
implied that the deleterious effects of  the system could be removed by 
such steps as shortening potential duration or taxing benefits. Brechling’s 
study  suggests that much  of  the same improvement can  be  effected 
instead by improving the experience rating in the UI tax. Changes on the 
benefit side are likely to be hard to implement, as workers nearly unani- 
mously see such changes as harmful to their interests. Improvements in 
experience rating, on the other hand, are clearly perceived by  many 
employers (generally larger firms with stable work forces) as beneficial, 
and appear not to concern workers. Accordingly, the results of the study 
should provide an intellectual basis for a reform of  UI that would be 
effective in keeping the program financially sound while removing some 
of  its unfortunate side effects. 
Notes 
1. The usual technique has been to include the weekly benefit payment and the wage 
prior to unemployment as separate variables or in ratio form (see Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 
1976; Classen 1977). More recently, Hamermesh (1979) has parameterized the structure of 
benefits to include amount, potential duration,  and qualifying requirements. 
2. For example, in the analysis of  the effects of  the availability of  UI benefits on  labor 
supply, we find that eligibility requirements induce a discontinuity in the budget constraint 
facing the household with unusual results on the choice of hours within some range of hours 
(see Hamermesh 1980). 
3.  Becker (1972: 14-15)  finds that in nine of  the ten states for which data were available, 
the cost rate-benefit  payments as a percent of  taxable payrolls-in  manufacturing in 1967 
exceeded the average for the state. 
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